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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/07/2005 Accident number: 413 
Accident time: 10:15 Accident Date: 27/06/2004 
Where it occurred: Puliyankulam village, 
Vavuniya District, 
Vanni 
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 28/06/2004 
ID original source: KS Name of source: LA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: P4Mk1 AP blast 
boosted 
Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 06/07/2005 Date  last modified: 06/07/2005 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: See map under "Other 
documents" 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: MF HDU 089 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
non injurious accident (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 




Details were made available by the demining group involved in October 2004. The IMSMA 
report, the content of which is summarised below, followed by the statements gathered by the 
internal investigation. 
“During the resting time the water tanker came inside of the minefield to water the minefield. 
When they complete watering they wanted to reverse the tanker and unfortunately the track 
was the place between bund and Base line.” 
“The driver of the water tanker wanted to reverse the tanker and unfortunately he drove in 
side of uncleared area.” 




[The blast crater left by the device is shown above.] 
The accident occurred on what was described as a “hard”, “hillside” with “medium” “grass” 
cover. 
The site had been last QA inspected during the previous month (the IMSMA date field 
does not require a day, merely a month and year). 
The demining group had been working at the site for 3 months, 1 week and three days. Work 
had been progressing on the day for 5 minutes when the initiation occurred. 
The accident was reported to the demining group HQ on 28/06/2004 at 10:00. The IMSMA 
report was dated “09/06/2004” [clearly an entry unchanged from the previous accident report]. 
 
Statements 
Statement Of  Section Leader [Name excised] 
I am the section leader of Team 07 – 2 Southern Group at 10.15  while we all were at rest 
area on rest suddenly heard an explosion and saw smoke coming from close to bund.   At 
once I went to the site of the explosion of the spot and I found the water tanker was on 
uncleared area and with no damage or injury. So I instructed to driver reverse the vehicle 
using the same track. Driver followed me. 
Section leaders additional comments: I believe that once three months before one day was 
very rainy so that date the team leader allowed to reverse the vehicle by using this same land 
but the driver was regional. But in this time driver was not regional and he didn’t ask us 
anything. 
 
Deminer of Section 2 team 7 [Name excised] 
I am the deminer of section 2 of  team 07 and have been working in this team for last 7 
months. I normally help water tank at the same manner while I was on the top of tanker after 
completing pouring water the driver managed to reverse on the base line but he couldn’t then 
suddenly I heard an explosion but I didn’t step on the floor but the driver was close to the 
back side wheel then I step on floor.  
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Statement of  Driver [Name excised] 
I am [name excised]  temporary driver of this water tanker while the regional driver was on 
leave I was the driver after pouring water to this minefield I wanted to reverse the tanker in the 
first time I reversed in appropriate place and in this time I used the uncleared area and I heard 
an explosion then I realized there was an mine accident for my vehicle.  
Normally  the driver used the base line and safety path to transport. When I trying  to  reverse 
the vehicle the cleaner said that we can reverse here and I followed.  
 
Cleaner of  water tanker  [Name excised] 
I am the cleaner and helper of this water tanker. I have been working here for last three 
months. To day the regional driver wasn’t with us so we replaced a new driver. We watered 
two times on this day and when we trying to get back out of mine field we should reversed. 
But the room wasn’t enough so I mentioned once we used the uncleared area that was 








The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the water 
bowser used was too big to be safely manoeuvred inside the mined area. It had been unable 
to turn without using the uncleared area on a previous occasion and the driver had been 
instructed to use the uncleared area. The instruction to use an uncleared area for vehicle 
turning is the reason that the secondary cause of the accident is listed as a “Field control 
inadequacy”. The field supervisors could have ordered areas close to the bund to be cleared 
so that the vehicle could manoeuvre on cleared land, but did not do so.  
The accident investigation is listed under “Notes” as inadequate because it includes no 
conclusions or recommendations. The statements gathered included contradictions and did 
not explain how the device was identified. The AP blast mine might be expected to have 
punctured a tyre, but the 60mm mortar attached apparently did no damage, which seems 
strange. 
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The demining group involved developed a Safe-lane water bowser capable of moving inside 2 
metre wide lanes and reversing along them during 2005. 
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